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EARNED SOVEREIGNTY:
JURIDICAL UNDERPINNINGS
MICHAEL P. SCHARF*
Sovereignty either is or is not.
-

Stephen Leacock 1

It is undeniable that the centuries-old doctrine of absolute and exclusive
sovereignty no longer stands, and was in fact never so absolute as it was
conceived to be in theory.
-

Boutros Boutros-Ghali

2

I. INTRODUCTION

It has often been said that "the defining issue in international law for the 21t
century is finding compromises between the principles of self-determination and
the sanctity of borders."3
Today, there are some 140 self-determination
movements world-wide. 4 Those aspiring to obtain self-determination often resort
to terrorism or armed conflict. Most of the groups on the United States (U.S.)
Department of State's list of terrorist organizations are self-determination
movements. 5 Meanwhile, there are currently secessionist conflicts under way in
numerous countries including Anjouan, Azerbaijan, Bougainville, Chechnya,
Georgia, Iraq, Israel, Kashmir, Moldova, Northern Ireland, Somaliland, Southern
Sudan, Spain, Sri Lanka, Tibet, the island of Mindanao in the Philippines, and
West Irian in Indonesia.

* Professor of Law and Director of the Frederick K. Cox International Law Center, Case Western
Reserve University School of Law; formerly Attorney-Adviser for United Nations Affairs, U.S.
Department of State.
1. G. C. FIELD, POLITICAL THEORY 60 (1956).

2. INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 18 (Louis Henkin et al. eds., 3d ed. 1993).
3. Lorie M. Graham, Self-Determinationfor Indigenous Peoples After Kosovo: TranslatingSelfDetermination "Into Practice" and "Into Peace," 6 ILSA J. INT'L & COMP. L. 455,465 (2000).
4. Halim Moris, Self-Determination:An Affirmative Right or Mere Rhetoric?, 4 ILSA J. INT'L &
CoMP. L. 201, 201 (1997).
5. U.S. Department of State, Office of Counterterrorism Fact Sheet: Foreign Terrorist
Organizations (Aug. 9, 2002), available at http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/fs/2OO2/12389.htm (last visited
Oct. 22, 2002).
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This piece is the second in a trilogy of three simultaneously published articles
in the Denver Journal of InternationalLaw that examine the emerging doctrine of
"earned sovereignty," a concept that seeks to reconcile the principles of selfdetermination and humanitarian intervention with the principles of sovereignty and
territorial integrity. This article sets forth the legal underpinnings for the doctrine,
while the other two articles in the trilogy provide its policy foundations, and apply
the doctrine to several modem case studies. Together, the three articles are the
product of the Public International Law and Policy Group's "Intermediate
Sovereignty Project," sponsored by a grant of the Carnegie Corporation.6
Traditionally, international lawyers have adhered to a rigid notion of
sovereignty. Under this view, sovereignty is "monolithic" and "possessed in full
or not at all:" 7 As one author has stated, "'sovereign,' like 'unique,' cannot take
certain qualifying adverbs.' 8 An entity either was or was not sovereign.
This unyielding conception has hindered diplomats in their effort to craft
creative means for resolving conflicts involving attempts at self-determination or
secession. For example, "[tihere is little doubt that the collective inability of the
Western powers to see beyond the statist/secessionist models was partly
responsible for the collapse of Bosnia and the war in Krajina." 9 The adoption of
extreme positions, dictated by the conventional view of sovereignty, from support
for the sanctity of Yugoslavia to the recognition of the secession of its federal
republics, was a recipe for disaster. 0 Conversely, where diplomats experimented
with new conceptions of sovereignty without legal sanctification, the rule of law
and role of international lawyers in the policy making process suffered."
To remedy this, it is necessary for international lawyers to adopt a new view
of sovereignty existing as a spectrum, and recognize a range of intermediate
sovereign statuses as part of that spectrum. Intermediate sovereignty and the
associated concepts of deferred sovereignty, conditional independence, and
provisional statehood may take the form of heightened autonomy for a group,
earned recognition, or phased recognition. The term is meant to describe an entity
that is something less than a fully sovereign state, but more than a sub-state entity.
This article begins with an examination of the history of the concept of
sovereignty, revealing that numerous states are in fact less than fully sovereign.
Next, it analyzes the evolving principle of self-determination, focusing in
6. Bridging Self-Determination and Sovereignty: The Intermediate Sovereignty
available at www.intermediatesovereignty.org (last visited Oct. 25, 2002).

Project,

7. INIS L. CLAUDE, JR., NATIONAL MINORITIES: AN INTERNATIONAL PROBLEM 32 (The Pa. State

Univ. Press 1995).
8. Steven Lee, A Puzzle of Sovereignty: Sovereignty Either is or is Not, 27 CAL. W. INT'L L.J.
241, 241 (1997).
9. Gerry J.Simpson, The Diffusion of Sovereignty: Self-Determination in the PostcolonialAge,
32 STAN. J. INT'L L. 255, 282 (1996).
10. Id.
11. At a workshop on "Failed States and the Collapse of Sovereign Authority" sponsored by the
U.S. Department of State on May 17, 2002, one State Department official suggested that as a result of
perceived narrow thinking on the part of Department's Office of the Legal Adviser, the members of the
Office have been excluded from meetings in which they traditionally had participated.
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particular on the emerging notion of a remedial right to secession. The concluding
section explains how recognition of a more flexible and pragmatic conception of
sovereignty and a remedial right to secession lays the legal foundation for
application of the earned sovereignty concept.
II. THE MEANING OF SOVEREIGNTY

There are several different meanings of the term sovereignty.' 2 In the context
of this article, sovereignty is concerned with establishing the status of a political
entity in the international system. Under the conventional view, an entity qualified
as a sovereign state if it had a territory, a population, a government and formal
juridical autonomy. 13 If an entity did not qualify as a sovereign state, it was
deemed a dependent or subordinate territory of a sovereign state. Thus, an entity
was either sovereign or it was not. There was no such thing as an in between status
such as "earned sovereignty."
Sovereignty is perceived as a "ticket of general admission to the international
arena." 14 A sovereign state is accepted as a juridical equal of other States. It is
entitled to political independence, territorial integrity, and virtually exclusive
control and jurisdiction within that territory. 15 Its sovereign acts are generally
immune from civil suit in other states, its representatives are entitled to diplomatic
immunity from both civil and criminal actions, and its ruler is entitled to absolute
head of state immunity. 16 It can enter into agreements with other States.' 7 It can
be a member of international organizations. Dependent or subordinate territories,
in contrast, do not customarily possess any of these rights in the international
system. 19
Contrary to the conventional view, since the dawn of the state system 355
years ago with the Peace of Westphalia, very few states have actually possessed
full juridical autonomy.2 ° Rather, most states in the world might more accurately
12. STEPHEN D. KRASNER, SOVEREIGNTY: ORGANIZED HYPOCRISY 9-25 (1999) (of the four

meanings of sovereignty that Krasner describes, we are concerned here with what Krasner labels
"International Legal Sovereignty").
13. Id. at 14-15.
14. MICHAEL Ross FOWLER & JULIE MARIE BUNK, LAW, POWER, AND THE SOVEREIGN STATE:
THE EVOLUTION AND APPLICATION OF THE CONCEPT OF SOVEREIGNTY 12 (1995).

15. KRASNER, supra note 12, at 20-21.
16. Id. at 17.
17. Id. at 16.
18. Id. at 17.
19. Id. at 16.
20. Stephen D. Krasner, Pervasive Not Perverse: Semi-Sovereigns as the Global Norm, 30
CORNELL INT'L L.J. 651, 652 (1997). The state system, characterized as an association of sovereign
states, is widely believed to have originated with the Peace of Westphalia, which ended the thirty years
war in 1648. The Peace of Westphalia was composed of two separate agreements: (1)the Treaty of
Osnabruck concluded between the Protestant Queen of Sweden and her allies on the one side, and the
Holy Roman Habsburg Emperor and the German Princes on the other; and (2) the Treaty of Munster
concluded between the Catholic King of France and his allies on the one side, and the Holy Roman
Habsburg Emperor and the German Princes on the other. The Conventional view of the Peace of
Westphalia is that by recognizing the German Princes as sovereign, these treaties signaled the beginning
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be characterized as quasi-sovereigns.
History is replete with examples of quasi-sovereign states, including the
member states of the Federal State of Germany before the First World War, each
of which retained the right to send and receive diplomats. 21 The reigning
monarchs of these several component states of Germany were 22treated by foreign
states as if they were the monarchs of fully independent entities.
Several quasi-sovereign states were permitted to ratify treaties and participate
alongside sovereign states as full members of international organizations. India,
for example, was a member of the League of Nations and a signatory of the
Versailles Treaty even though it was still a colony of Britain.23 Later, both India
and the Philippines were permitted to serve as founding members of the United
Nations (U.N.) even though they did not become formally independent from
Britain and the United States until 1946 and 1947 respectively. 24 Andorra, which
is a tiny territory nestled in the Pyrenees between France and Spain, became a
member of the United Nations in 1993 and the Council of Europe in 1994 even
though France and Spain have control over its security affairs and retain the right
to appoint two of the four members of its Constitutional Tribunal.25 The "freely
associated states" of Micronesia, the Marshall Islands, and Palau have each
attained U.N. membership although the United States continues to maintain control
of their national security policy. 26 And Hong Kong, at the time a British Colony
and currently part of China, became a founding member of the World Trade
Organization.27
On the other side of the spectrum are states that have ceded away portions of
their juridical autonomy through treaties. Thus, the member states of the European
Union can be deemed quasi-sovereign, in that the decisions of the European Court
of Justice and the European Court of Human Rights have supremacy and direct
effect within their territory. Similarly, any state that borrows money from an
international financial institution such as the International Monetary Fund or the

of a new era. But in fact, the power to conclude alliances formally recognized at Westphalia was not
unqualified, and was in fact a power that the German Princes had already possessed for almost half a
century. Furthermore, although the treaties eroded some of the authority of the Habsburg Emperor, the
Empire remained a key actor according to the terms of the treaties. For example, the Imperial Diet
retained the powers of legislation, warfare, and taxation, and it was through Imperial bodies, such as the
Diet and the Courts, that religious safeguards mandated by the Treaty were imposed on the German
Princes. See Stephane Beaulac, The Westphalian Legal Orthodoxy - Myth orReality? 2 JOURNAL OF
THE HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 148 (2000). For the full text of the Osnabruck and Munster
Treaties, in both their Latin and English versions, see C. Parry (ed.), Consolidated Treaty Series, Vol. 1
(Dobbs Ferry, U.S.: Oceana Publications, 1969), at 119 and 270.
21. OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW 250 n.9 (Robert Jennings & Arthur Watts eds., 9th ed.
1992).
22. OPPENHEIM, supra note 21, at 250 n. 9.
23. KRASNER, supra note 13, at 15.
24. Id. at 15.
25. Id. at 229-30.
26. See United Nations Web Site, List of Member States at http://www.un.org/overview/
unmember.html (last visited Jan. 27, 2003).
27. KRASNER, supra note 13, at 16.
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World Bank is subject to conditionality requirements that involve issues of what
Although these international
the World Bank terms "good governance., 28
commitments may be viewed as a manifestation of the exercise of sovereignty, the
ultimate effect is in fact a diminution of the traditional attributes of sovereignty.
Also relevant are states that have been stripped of their autonomy at the
conclusion of international armed conflict. For instance, under the terms of the
occupation statute that created the West German state in 1949, the allied powers
retained authority over foreign trade and exchange, demilitarization, and foreign
affairs including international agreements made on behalf of Germany. 29 The
German state established in 1949 did not attain independent status until 1955, and
even then it did not exercise full autonomy. 30 Similarly, after the Second World
War, the basic constitutional structures and policies of the eastern European states,
with the exception of Yugoslavia and Albania, were determined by the Soviet
Union. 31 Through force or threat of force, Soviet Premier Joseph Stalin imposed
dependent communist regimes throughout Eastern Europe, transforming a dozen
states in the region into Soviet controlled satellites, which were nonetheless
32
Most recently, in 2003 the United
granted membership in the United Nations.
States and United Kingdom invaded Iraq, overthrew the regime of Saddam
Hussein, and established an occupation government to administer the country
during a phased transition to sovereignty.
While the proposed recognition of the status of intermediate sovereignty has
not yet been extensively accepted in international law, the quasi-sovereign
character of many of the states in the contemporary international system and many
states in the past, suggests that solutions to issues of self-determination should not
require rigid conformity with the principles that are conventionally and
misleadingly associated with sovereignty.

III. EVOLVING NOTIONS OF SELF-DETERMINATION
A.

InternationalRecognition of the Principleof Self-Determination

Traditionally, international law viewed the formation of new sovereign
entities as purely a political matter. International law came into play only after the
de facto existence of the new state.33 During the period of decolonization (in
which more than 100 new sovereign countries were recognized), however, the
creation of states was for the first time subject to international law in the form of
the principle of self-determination.

28. Id. at 225-26.
29. Id. at 210.
30. Id. at 210 (of the four meanings of sovereignty that Krasner analyzes, we are concerned here
with what Krasner labels "International Legal Sovereignty.").
31. KRASNER, supra note 21, at212.
32. Id.
33. JAMES CRAWFORD, THE CREATION OF STATES ININTERNATIONAL LAW 47-48 (1979).
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President Woodrow Wilson was responsible for elevating the principle of
self-determination to the international level when, in 1916, he included it in his
Fourteen Points. 34 But President Wilson's call for self-determination was not so
much intended to apply to the global empires of the victorious European powers as
it was an effort to ensure that the vanquished empires of Europe did not rise again
and to extend American commercial interests to new parts of the world.35
The principle of self-determination is included in Articles 1, 55, and 73 of the
United Nations Charter.36 The right to self-determination has also been repeatedly
recognized in a series of resolutions adopted by the U.N. General Assembly, the
most important of which is Resolution 2625 (XXV) of 1970.37 While these
resolutions are not in themselves binding, they do constitute an authoritative
interpretation of the U.N. Charter and may represent opinio juris respecting
o cases,
a
including the Namibia Case in
customary international law. 38 In a series of
39

1970,

the Western Sahara case in 1975,40 the FrontierDispute case in 1986,41

and the Case Concerning East Timor in 1995,42 the International Court of Justice
held that the principle of self-determination crystallized into a rule of customary
international law, applicable to and binding on all states.
The principle of self-determination was further codified in the Universal
Declaration on Human Rights,43 the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, and in the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural
Rights, which together are considered to constitute the international "Bill of
Rights." 4 The vast majority of countries of the world are party to the two
34. President Woodrow Wilson, Address before the League of Nations to Enforce Peace (May 27,
1916), in 53 CONG. REC. 8854 (May 29, 1916) ("We believe these fundamental things: First that every
people have a right to choose the sovereignty under which they shall live...").
35. C. Lloyd Brown-John, Self-Determination, Autonomy and State Secession in Federal
Constitutionaland InternationalLaw, 40 S. TEX. L. REV. 567, 572 (1999).
36. U.N. Charter art. 1, para. 2; See also U.N. Charter arts. 55, 73 (while the term "selfdetermination" does not occur within Article 73 of the U.N. Charter, the terms "self-government" and
self-government... political aspirations... and progressive development of.. .free political institutions"
do occur).
37. G.A. Res. 2625, U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp. No. 28, at 121, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1970)
[hereinafter G.A. Res. 2625].
AUTONOMY,
SOVEREIGNTY,
38. HURST HANNUM,
ACCOMMODATION OF CONFLICTING RIGHTS 45 (1990).

AND

SELF-DETERMINATION:

THE

39. Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South
West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), 1971 I.C.J. 16, 31-32 (June 21).
40. Western Sahara, 1975 I.C.J. 12, 31-33 (Oct. 16).
41. Concerning the Frontier Dispute (Burk. Faso v. Rep. of Mali), 1986 I.C.J. 554, 566-567 (Dec.
22) [hereinafter Frontier Dispute Case].
42. Concerning East Timor (Port. v. Austl.), 1995 I.C.J. 90, 265-68 (June 30).
43. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Dec. 10, 1948, art. 22.
44. Article 1, common to both the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights reads:
1. All peoples have the right of self-determination. By virtue of that right they
freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social
and cultural development;
The States Parties to the present Covenant ...shall promote the realization of
2.
the right of self-determination, and shall respect that right, in conformity with
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Covenants, which constitute binding treaty law.
Under the principle of self-determination, all self-identified groups with a
coherent identity and connection to a defied territory are entitled to collectively

determine their political destiny in a democratic fashion and to be free from
systematic persecution.4 5 For such groups, the principle of self-determination may
be effectuated by a variety of means, including self-government, substantial

autonomy, free association, or arguably, in certain circumstances, outright
independence/full sovereignty.46
B.

Who is Entitled to Self-Determination?

For a group to be entitled to a right to collectively determine its political
destiny, it must possess a focus of identity sufficient for it to attain distinctiveness
as a people.47
The traditional two-part test examines first "objective" elements of the group
to ascertain the extent to which its members share a common racial background,
ethnicity, language, religion, history and cultural heritage.4 s Another important
objective factor is the territorial integrity of the area the group is claiming.49
The second "subjective prong" of the test requires an examination of the
extent to which individuals within the group self-consciously perceive themselves
collectively as a distinct "people."'50 It necessitates that a community needs to
explicitly express a shared sense of values and a common goal for its future.
Another subjective factor is the degree to which the group can form a viable
political entity. 5'

the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations.
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, art. 1, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 173;
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, art. 1,993
U.N.T.S. 3, 5.
45. G.A. Res. 2625, supranote 37, at 123-124.
46. Id.

47. The United Nations Economic and Social Cooperation Organization (UNESCO) defines
"people" as individuals who relate to one another not just on the level of individual association, but also
based upon a shared consciousness, and possibly with institutions that express their identity. UNESCO
considers the following indicative characteristics in defining people: (a) a common historical tradition;
(b) religious or ethnic identity; (c) cultural homogeneity; (d) linguistic unity; (e) religious or ideological
affinity; (f) territorial connection; and (g) common economic life. See Patrick Thornberry, The
Democraticor Internal Aspect of Self-Determination With Some Remarks on Federalism, in MODERN
LAW OF SELF-DETERMINATION 10 1-104 (Christian Tomuschat ed., 1993).
48. Ved P. Nanda, Self-Determination Under InternationalLaw: Validity of Claims to Secede, 13
CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 257, 276 (1981).
49. Lea Brilmayer, Secession and Self-Determination: A TerritorialInterpretation, 16 YALE J.
INT'L L. 177, 178-79 (1991).
50. See Nanda, supra note 48, at 276.
51. Id.
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Does Self-Determination Create a Right to Secession and Independence?

All nations carry within their territories other nations, and since secession is
synonymous with the dismemberment of states, the international community
understandably views it with suspicion. "If each group within a state can claim the
right to self-determination and succeed, self-destruction of virtually every state
could result., 52 Thus, at the time the U.N. Charter was formed, the drafters made it
clear that the right to self-determination did not give rise to a right to secession
under any circumstances." In this regard, one may note the 1970 statement of
U.N. Secretary-General U. Thant to justify the inactivity of the U.N. during the
secessionist conflict in Biafra:
As far as the question of secession of a particular section of a State is concerned,
the United Nations attitude is unequivocable. As an international organization,
the United Nations has never accepted and does not accept and I do not 54believe it
will ever accept the principle of secession of a part of its Member States.
Traditionally, the right to pursue independence as an exercise of the principle
of self-determination was applied only to people under "colonial domination,"
"alien domination," or "racist oppression," and under the principle known as uti
possidetis states were permitted to become independent only within their former
colonial boundaries. 55 This was not characterized as an exception to the general
rule rejecting the right of secession because the independence of a colony was not
considered "a secession," as that term was reserved for situations involving the
separation from a State of a portion of its domestic territory.56
Until recently, the international community subscribed to a theory of "saltwater colonialism," under which self-determination could only apply to territories
which were separated from their metropolitan parent by oceans or high seas. In
this way, overland acquisitions such as those made by China and the Soviet Union
were excluded from consideration. Also excluded were the ethnic groups within a
colonial territory who regarded the majority rule as alien or oppressive. Thus, it is
said that in the post-colonial world, "the right to57self-determination is rarely
recognized until it is won through a bloody conflict.

52. Ediberto Roman, Reconstructing Self-Determination: The Role of Critical Theory in the
Positivist InternationalLaw Paradigm, 53 U. MIAMI L. REv. 943, 95 8-959 (1999).
53. The United Nations Conference on International Organization, UNCIO Doc. 343, Vol. VI, at
296 (1945) (during the works of the Committee I/1 at the Conference of San Francisco, it was agreed
that "the principle conformed to the purposes of the Charter only insofar as it implied the right of selfgovernment of peoples and not the right to secession.").
54. Secretary-General's Press Conferences, in 7 U.N. MONTHLY CHRONICLE 36 (Feb. 1970).
55. See Frontier Dispute Case, supra note 41, at 565. In the Frontier Dispute Case, the
International Court of Justice acknowledged an "apparent contradiction" between the principles of uti
possidetis and self-determination. Id. at 567. But the Court did not elaborate on this statement because
it was limited by an agreement of the parties to resolve their dispute on the basis of the "principle of
intangibility of frontiers inherited from colonization." Id. at 565.
56. Id. at 565.
57. See Simpson, supra note 9, at 263.
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58
However, the modem trend, evidenced by the writing of numerous scholars, 6
59
0
conferences,
U.N. General Assembly resolutions, declarations of international
62
61
judicial pronouncements, decisions of international arbitral tribunals, and some
state practice supports the right of non-colonial "people" to secede from an
existing state when the group is collectively denied civil and political rights and
subject to egregious abuses. This has become known as the "remedial" right to
secession.

The remedial right to secession has its origin in the advisory opinion given by
the second Commission of Rapporteurs in the 1920 Aaland Islands Case.63 After
excluding the existence of a general right to secede, the Commission observed that
"[t]he separation of a minority from the State of which it forns part and its
incorporation into another State may only be considered as an altogether
exceptional solution, a last resort when the State lacks either the will or the power
to enact and apply just and effective guarantees [for the protection of
minorities] .64
The denial of the exercise of the right of democratic self-government as a
precondition to the right of a non-colonial people to dissociate from an existing
state is supported most strongly by the United Nations' 1970 Declaration on
Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations, which frames the

58. See Curtis G. Berkey, InternationalLaw and Domestic Courts: EnhancingSelf-Determination
for IndigenousPeoples, 5 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 65, 79 n.88 (1992); Deborah Z. Cass, Re-Thinking SelfDetermination:A CriticalAnalysis of CurrentInternationalLaw Theories, 18 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. &
COM. 21 (1992); Antonio Cassese, The Self-Determination of Peoples, in THE INTERNATIONAL BILL OF
RIGHTS: THE COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS 92, 101 (Louis Henkin ed., 1981); Thomas
M. Franck, Postmodern Tribalism and the Right to Secession, in PEOPLES AND MINORITIES IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW 2, 13-14 (Catherine Brolmann et al., eds., 1993); Otto Kimminich, A "Federal"
Right of Self-Determination?, in MODERN LAW OF SELF-DETERMINATION 83 (Christian Tomuschat,
ed., 1993); Frederic L. Kirgis, Jr., The Degrees of Self-Determination in the United Nations Era, 88
AM. J. INT'L L. 304 (1994); W. OFUATEY-KODJOE, THE PRINCIPLE OF SELF-DETERMINATION IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW 181-190 (1977); Gerry J. Simpson, Judging the East Timor Dispute: SelfDeterminationat the InternationalCourt of Justice, 17 HASTINGS INT'L L. & COMP. L. REV. 323, 340
(1994); Christian Tomuschat, Self-Determination in a Post-Colonial World, in MODERN LAW OF SELFDETERMINATION 1, 2-8 (Christian Tomuschat, ed., 1993).
59. See G.A. Res. 2625, supranote 37, at 121-124.
60. Vienna Declarationand Programme of Action, World Conference on Human Rights, U.N.
Doc. A/CONF.157/23 (1993), reprinted in 32 ILM 1661 (1993) [hereinafter Vienna Declaration and
Programme of Action].
61. See, e.g., Decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in the Matter of Section 53 of the Supreme
Court Act, and in the matter of a Reference by the Governor in Council Concerning Certain Questions
Relating to the Secession of Quebec from Canada, as set out in Order in Council P.C. 1996-1497, dated
September 30, 1996, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217, para. 154 [hereinafter Decision of the Supreme Court of
Canada].
62. See, e.g., Conference on Yugoslavia Arbitration Commission Opinion No. 1, Opinions on the
Questions Arising from the Dissolution of Yugoslavia, Nov. 1992, 31 I.L.M. 1488, 1494-1497
[hereinafter Conference on Yugoslavia].
63. Report of the International Committee of Jurists Entrusted by the Council of the League of
Nations with the Task of Giving an Advisory Opinion upon the Legal Aspects of the Aaland Islands
Question, LEAGUE OF NATIONS O.J. Spec. Supp. 3 (1920).
64. Id.

DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y

VOL. 31:3

proper balance between self-determination and territorial integrity as follows:
Nothing in the foregoing paragraphs shall be construed as authorizing or
encouraging any action which would dismember or impair, totally or in part, the
territorial integrity of political unity of sovereign and independent States
conducting themselves in compliance with the principle of equal rights and selfdetermination of peoples as described above and thus possessed of a government
people belonging to the territory without distinction as to
representing the whole
65
race, creed or color.
By this declaration, the General Assembly indicated that the right of territorial
integrity takes precedence over the right to self-determination only so long as the
state possesses "a government representing the whole people belonging to the
territory without distinction as to race, creed or color. 66 Reasoning a contrario,
where such representative government is not present, "peoples" within existing
states are entitled to exercise their right to self-determination through secession.
A similar clause was included in the 1993 Vienna Declaration of the World
Conference on Human Rights, which was accepted by all United Nations member
states.67 However, unlike the 1970 Declaration on Friendly relations, the Vienna
Declaration did not confine the list of impermissible distinctions to those based on
"race, creed, or color," indicating that distinctions based on religion, ethnicity,
language or other factors would also trigger the right to secede.68
Further references by U.N. bodies to the right to "remedial secession" can be
found in the 1993 Report of the Rapporteur to the U.N. Sub-Commission Against
the Discrimination and the Protection of Minorities on Possible Ways and Means
of Facilitating the Peaceful and Constructive Solution of Problems Involving
Minorities,6 9 and in General Recommendation XXI adopted in 1996 by the
Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination.70
Most recently, in considering whether Quebec could properly secede from
Canada, the Canadian Supreme Court found that:
A right to secession only arises under the principle of self-determination of
peoples at international law where "a people" is governed as part of a colonial
empire; where "a people" is subject to alien subjugation, domination or
exploitation; and possibly where "a people" is denied any meaningful71exercise of
its right to self-determination within the state of which it forms a part.

65. G.A. Res. 2625, supra note 37, at 124.
66. Id.
67. See Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, supra note 61, at para. 2.

68. See Id
69. Protection of Minorities: Possible Ways and Means of Facilitating the Peaceful and
Constructive Solution of Problems Involving Minorities, Commission on Human Rights: Subh
commission on Prevention and Protection of Minorities, 45" Sess., Agenda Item 17, at para. 84, U.N.
Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1993/34 (1993).
70. Report of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, UN GAOR, 51st Sess.,
Supp. No. 18 at 125-26, para. 11,U.N. Doc. A/51/18 (1996).
71. See Decision of the Supreme Court of Canada, supra note 62, at para. 154.
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The Court then went on to declare:
A state, whose government represents the whole of the people or peoples resident
within its territory, on a basis of equality and without discrimination, and respects
the principles of self-determination in its internal arrangements, is entitled to
maintain its territorial integrity under
72 international law and to have the territorial
integrity recognized by other states.
The Court found that because the people of Quebec were not "denied
meaningful access to government to pursue their political, economic, cultural and
social development, they were not entitled to secede from Canada" without the
agreement of the Canadian government.73 Implicit in this decision, however, is the
proposition that had the Court found that the people of Quebec were denied any
such right of democratic self-government and respect for human rights, unilateral
secession from Canada would have been permissible under international law.
As for actual State practice, the existence of a right to remedial secession is
supported by the 1971 secession of Bangladesh from Pakistan (with the aid of
India), which was justified on the ground that the Bengali population was victim of
massive economic and political discrimination as well as violence and repression.
Another development that lends credence to the idea that a new post-colonial
right to remedial secession may be on the point of crystallizing is the U.N.sanctioned intervention on behalf of the Kurds in May 1991. 74 The rationale for
this intervention was that the Kurds in northern Iraq were suffering massive human
rights deprivations inflicted by the Iraqi government.75 Subsequent to the
intervention, the Kurds enjoyed the benefits of de facto intermediate sovereignty
from Baghdad's harsh rule as a consequence of the U.S.- and British-enforced nofly zone over northern Iraq.
More recently, in the case of the dissolution of the former Yugoslavia, the
republics of Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Macedonia were deemed
entitled to secede on the basis that they were denied the proper exercise of their
right of democratic self-government, they possessed clearly defined borders within
the umbrella state, and, in some cases, they were subject to ethnic aggression and
crimes against humanity committed by the forces of the central government of
Belgrade.76 Notably, the international community did not consider that the
Bosnian Serb entity known as Republika Srpska was entitled to disassociate from
Bosnia-Herzegovina because, although it possessed a right of political autonomy, it
was not denied the proper exercise of its political rights, and it did not possess
historically defined borders.77 On the contrary, in the case of the Serb autonomous
region of Kosovo, the international community (through North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (N.A.T.O) action) supported the effort of the Albanian Kosovars to
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
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attain a status that was characterized as "intermediate sovereignty" within
Kosovo's regional borders in the face of ethnic cleansing and repression by the
central government of Serbia.78
These authorities suggest that if a government is at the high end of the scale
of representative government, the only modes of self-determination that will be
given international backing are those with minimal destabilizing effect and
achieved by consent of all parties. If a government is extremely unrepresentative
and abusive, then much more potentially destabilizing modes of selfdetermination, including independence, may be recognized as legitimate.79 In the
latter case, the secessionist group would be fully entitled to seek and receive
external aid, and third-party states and organizations would have no duty to refrain
from providing support.80
D. Rulesfor Achieving Independence
Where a people are entitled to resort to remedial secession, international law
may provide guidance on how independence may be achieved. As Professor
Franck, one of the "five experts" consulted in the 1992 Opinion on the
consequences of a secession of Quebec from Canada, recalls, "so we were able to
say to the Quebec government, international law does not tell you whether you
have a right to secede or not, but it does tell you that unless you do it according to
[certain] rules you are likely to run into a lot of flak from the international
community.'
Recent state practice indicates that as a precondition to the legitimate
attainment of international status, a self-identified group seeking to disassociate
itself from the parent state must first affirmatively demonstrate that it was denied
the ability to exercise its right of democratic self-government and that its people
were denied basic human rights.82 Second, it must respect the principle of uti
possidetis, whereby states become independent within their colonial or
administrative boundaries and may not seek to obtain territory held by third
states. 83 Third, the new state must commit itself to the respect for the rule of law,
78. Paul R. Williams, EarnedSovereignty: The Road to Resolving the Kosovo Conflict over Final
Status, 31 DENVER J. INT'L L. 387 (2004).
79. See Kirgis, supra note 58, at 304. Some commentators have taken the position that the right of
a people to secede must further be based on a "balancing of conflicting principles," considering such
factors as "the nature of the group, its situation within its governing state, its prospects for an
independent existence, and the effect of its separation on the remaining population and the world
community in general. LEE C. BUCHHEIT, SECESSION: THE LEGITIMACY OF SELF-DETERMINATION 217
(1978); MICHLA POMERANCE, SELF-DETERMINATION IN LAW AND PRACTICE 73-74 (1982).
80. Cf. G.A. Res. 6(t), U.N. GAOR, 31st Sess., Supp. No. 39, at 10, 15, U.N. Doc. A/31/39
(1976) (appealing to member states "to provide all assistance required by the oppressed people of South
Africa and their national liberation movements during their legitimate struggle").
81. Thomas M. Franck, Remarks at the Proceedings of the 8 7 h Annual Meeting, in PROCEEDINGS
OF THE AMERICAN SOCIETY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, Mar.-Apr. 1993, at 26 1.
82. European Community: Declaration on Yugoslavia and on the Guidelines on the Recognition
of the New States, 31 I.L.M. 1485, 1486-1487 (1992).
83. Id.

2003

EARNED SOVEREIGNTY: JURIDICAL UNDERPINNINGS

democracy and human rights, including the need for guarantees for the rights of
minorities, the inviolability of all frontiers,84 and all commitments with regard to
disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation.
As described in more detail in the other two articles in this series,
intermediate sovereignty and phased/earned recognition can be a particularly
useful mechanism for the international community to employ to facilitate the
responsible exercise of the right of remedial secession consistent with the
preconditions set forth above. It would involve an initial period of heightened
autonomy and self-government, the interim maintenance of territorial association
with the parent state, international monitoring, and the possibility of attaining full
sovereignty after meeting a series of benchmarks over time. The intermediate
sovereignty approach can be employed with the parent state's consent (albeit
obtained under threat of sanction or force) or in the absence of its consent (e.g., as
a result of humanitarian intervention).
IV. CONCLUSION

The maintenance of territorial integrity is vital in light of the disruptive
consequences of breaches of that integrity. But since its ultimate purpose is to
safeguard the interests of the peoples of a territory, it follows that "[t]he concept of
territorial integrity is meaningful only so long as it continues to fulfill that purpose
to all the sections of the people." 85
The modem trend is to treat territorial integrity as a rebuttable presumption,
which can be invoked only by states that act in accordance with the principle of
self-determination. International support for transitional independence in the form
of phased sovereignty must be recognized as a valid remedy when the state's
actions extinguish that presumption, thus resolving the tension between territorial
integrity and self-determination.
This article has illustrated that sovereignty was never as absolute in practice
as in theory. Consequently, earned sovereignty may be no more than an old wine
in a new bottle. But its value to diplomats is that this new bottle may be attractive
enough to sell to those seeking to exercise the newly recognized right of remedial
secession, who have grown unsatisfied with the prospect of simple autonomy. At
the same time this less potent vintage (which carries with it the possibility of
permanent intermediate sovereign status) may, with a little coaxing, prove
palatable to parent states, which oppose complete secession.
As described in the other two articles in this trilogy, developments in Bosnia,
Kosovo, Montenegro, East Timor and Iraq suggest that the time has come to
embrace de jure the new reality of earned sovereignty that is emerging from
diplomatic practice.
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